Is it is or is it ain't my obligation? Regional debt in a fiscal federation by Russell Cooper et al.
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLAS
IS IT ISO RIS IT AIN’T MY OBLIGATION?
REGIONAL DEBT IN A FISCAL FEDERATION




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF DALLASIs it is or is it Ain't my Obligation? Regional Debt in a Fiscal
Federation ¤
Russell Coopery , Hubert Kempfz , and Dan Peledx
September 5, 2005
Abstract
This paper studies the repayment of regional debt in a multi-region economy with a central authority:
who pays the obligation issued by a region? With commitment, a central government will use its taxation
power to smooth distortionary taxes across regions. Absent commitment, the central government may be
induced to bailout the regional government in order to smooth consumption and distortionary taxes across
the regions. We characterize the conditions under which bailouts occur and their welfare implications.
The gains to creating a federation are higher when the (government spending) shocks across regions are
negatively correlated and volatile. We use these insights to comment on actual ¯scal relations in three
quite di®erent federations: the US, the European Union and Argentina.
1 Introduction
Fiscal constraints, typically in the form of debt limits, on governments within a federation are prevalent.
Restrictions on borrowing by states in the U.S. and the Stability and Growth Pact of the European Monetary
Union are leading examples. These ¯scal constraints have an obvious cost: they limit the ability of a regional
government to smooth distortionary taxes over time. These constraints have a more subtle gain: they may
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1substitute for the inability of a central government to commit not to bailout a regional government.1 In
anticipation of a bail-out, regional governments will run excessive de¯cits in an attempt to spread the
costs of local public goods onto agents in other regions. The resulting ine±ciency is a consequence of the
commitment problem of the central government. If the central government could commit not to bailout a
regional government, excessive de¯cits would not arise. Thus we ask: what is the source of the commitment
problem and what remedies are there to overcome it?
We highlight two motivations for an ex post bail-out of regional debt by the central government and
thus two sources of the commitment problem. First, a central government may bailout the debt of regional
government in order to smooth consumption across agents. This consumption smoothing motive re°ects
the objective of a central government which values equality of consumption across agents in the economy.
In the model, the objective function of a central government is to maximize the sum of the welfare of
agents in the multiple regions. If the utility functions of the agents are strictly concave, then the objective
function of the central government will inherit this property and thus a desire to smooth consumption.
Without commitment, the central government can be induced to bailout a regional government if the resulting
allocation is more equitable.
The extent of the consumption smoothing motive will depend on the allocation of debt holdings across
agents. While individual agents will be, in equilibrium, indi®erent regarding the composition of their port-
folio, bailout will occur when a su±ciently large fraction of the debt of a rich region is held by agents in a
poorer region. If, instead, debt issued by a region is held solely by agents within that region, then there is
no bailout and each region repays its own obligation with regional taxes.
Second, the central government may have an incentive to smooth distortionary taxes and thus bailout
the debt of a regional government. This tax smoothing motive re°ects the presence of distortionary labor
taxes. The central government has, by assumption, the power to tax all agents at the same rate and thus
to smooth the tax burden across agents in di®erent regions. Thus if two regions have di®erent tax burdens,
the central government will be induced to use its tax power to smooth distortionary taxes across them. This
tax smoothing motive does not rest on the distribution of debt holdings across regions.
Independent of the source of the commitment problem, the bail-out is ex post in the interest of the central
government and thus the agents in the economy it represents. However, from an ex ante perspective, the
central government would, if feasible, commit to other policies.2 Thus, private agents in the economy are
worse o® because of the central government's inability to commit not to bailout the regional governments.
In equilibrium, the bail-out limits consumption and tax smoothing in the overall economy.
Even absent commitment, there may still be gains to a federation. These economic gains depend positively
1Commitment problems also lie at the heart of other analyzes of interactions between levels of governments, including
Zarazaga (1995), Chari and Kehoe (1998), Cooper and Kempf (2001), Cooper and Kempf (2004) and Sanguinetti and Tommasi
(2004).
2As we shall see, in some cases these policies include some ex ante intervention to smooth taxes across regions. Thus as the
analysis proceeds we are careful to distinguish these °ows from the ex post transfers which we associate with a bail-out.
2on the volatility of the spending shocks, and negatively on their correlation. When spending shocks are
su±ciently volatile and negatively correlated across regions, revenue sharing across regions induced by a
bail-out is an e±cient way to minimize the variability of distortionary taxes in each region.
The striking result that a central government will bailout regional governments raises the question of
limiting bail-outs and motivates various ¯scal restrictions within federations. Institutional features like
balanced-budget constitutional provisions are common in many federal unions, as in the U.S. These same
issues reappear in the ongoing discussion of ¯scal constraints within the European Union. We use our model
to comment on these devices.
2 A two region economy
We study allocations in an economy comprised of two regions. At one extreme, each region may be charac-
terized by its own government, fully sovereign and able to tax its citizens. It ¯nances its public programs
by taxation and receives no transfers from any other authority. Alternatively, there may exist an integrated
government, covering the entire economy, able to ¯nance regional public programs by means of a tax pol-
icy levied on all agents irrespective of the region where they live. These two institutional settings provide
benchmark allocations.
2.1 Model Overview
A two-period economy allows us to focus on consumption and tax smoothing in a dynamic setting. The
economy is composed of two regions, i = 1;2. In each period of life, agents supply labor, ni
t, and consume
(net of the disutility of work), ci
t, for t = 1;2 and i = 1;2.3 Each unit of labor input produces 1 unit of the
single good. After tax, this output can be either consumed or stored. We assume that agents have access
to a storage technology with an exogenous return of R. Importantly, there is no individual mobility: agents
live in one region and cannot avoid being taxed by their local government.
Thus we consider the following optimization problem for a representative agent in one of the regions:
maxfn1;n2;sgu
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where u(¢) and v(¢) are strictly increasing and concave.4 In what follows, we sometimes assume that v(c2) =
c2. This is an important restriction as it allows us to focus on bail-outs associated with the sharing of
distortionary taxes rather than bail-outs associated with redistribution of consumption alone. Agents incur
a disutility of work, in consumption terms, given by n
1+°
1+° where ° > 0.
Public spending per capita, G, enters directly into utility as a perfect substitute for private consumption.
In the subsequent analysis, G will be taken as a random variable with a known distribution. The optimization
3The notation has subscripts to denote the time period and superscripts to denote the region. Variables without superscripts
are aggregates.
4Since we are looking at a single region, the superscript is suppressed.
3problem is stated here for a given realization of G. There is a ¯rst period endowment of e which creates an
incentive to save, denoted by s. The tax rate on labor income in period t is given by ¿t so labor income,
after taxes, is nt(1 ¡ ¿t) in period t.
The ¯rst-order condition for labor in any period is
(1 ¡ ¿)
1
° = n (2)
where ¿ is the tax rate prevailing in that period. Call this labor supply relationship n(¿). Let »(¿) be the
elasticity of labor supply with respect to the labor tax: »(¿) = ¡¿
°(1¡¿). From (2), while the elasticity of labor
supply would be constant with respect to (1 ¡ ¿), it is not a constant with respect to ¿.
Let the after-tax total contribution to consumption from work, net of the disutility of work, be




Note Z0(¿) = ¡n(¿), when n(¿) satis¯es (2).
Using Z(¢), the household optimization problem can be recast as
W(¿1;¿2jG) = maxsu(G + e + Z(¿1) ¡ s) + ¯v(Z(¿2) + sR): (4)
The ¯rst-order condition is
u0(c1) = ¯Rv0(c2): (5)
From (4)
W¿1 = u0(c1)Z0(¿1); W¿2 = ¯v0(c2)Z0(¿2): (6)
2.2 Isolated regions
The multi-region economy to be analyzed in this paper consists of two economies, identical in all respects
to the one presented above. The public spending shocks (G1;G2) are drawn from a joint distribution. The
regional spending shocks may be correlated. In fact, some of our results depend on the magnitude and sign
of this correlation.
We ¯rst assume there is a single government in each region, i = 1;2, determining its ¯scal policy. Each
government is isolated, as there is no exchange nor any spillovers across regions.
To ¯nd optimal taxes, the representative government in region i will choose (¿i
1;¿i
2) to maximize W(¿i
1;¿i
2jGi)

















4where I(¿) ´ ¿n(¿) and Gi is given.5 The maximal amount of revenue the government can receive in a
period is obtained by a tax rate of ¿ =
°




(7) can always be satis¯ed with a constant tax rate.
If period 1 revenues do not cover Gi, then the regional government issues debt to cover the de¯cit. In
equilibrium, this debt pays the same return R as private storage. The optimal tax policy for the isolated
regional government is characterized by
Proposition 1 The optimal tax policy for the isolated region satis¯es ¿i
t = ¿iA for t = 1;2. Further, agent's
utility and consumption levels are decreasing functions of Gi.6
Here the optimal allocation for the isolated regions is indicated by a superscript A and is referred to as
the autarkic equilibrium. The optimal allocation entails both intertemporal tax smoothing and consumption
smoothing. The tax smoothing is seen by the equality of income taxes across periods in Proposition 1.
The government uses debt to smooth out distortionary taxes over time. Given the optimal tax policy
from Proposition 1 along with the budget constraint, the amount of debt issued by the government is




R . Agents use access to capital market to smooth consumption, as in (5).
If labor supply was completely inelastic, then of course taxes would not be distortionary, i.e. ° ! 1 so
that n(¿) = ´. In this case, the timing of taxes would not matter for consumption and labor allocations.
This is the familiar result of Ricardian equivalence applied to this economy.
Clearly, there is no consumption smoothing across regions in the autarkic equilibrium. Consumption,
(ciA
1 ;ciA
2 ), and taxation, ¿iA, depend on Gi but not on G¡i. Variations in the exogenous level of Gi in°uence
the lifetime utility of agents directly through the presence of Gi in the utility function and also indirectly
through the dependence of ¿iA on Gi.
The second part of the proposition shows that utility and consumption levels fall as Gi increases. Evi-
dently the direct e®ect of Gi on utility is more than o®set by the taxation e®ect. To understand this result,
if taxes were not distortionary, utility would be independent of Gi since, from the government budget con-
straint, total tax revenues would equal the transfer. But, when labor supply is responsive to tax rates, then
increases in Gi are welfare reducing due to the distortions of taxes on labor supply.
Let WA be the expected utility of an agent in this economy where the uncertainty is over the realized
value of government spending G. This level of expected utility will be used to characterize the welfare e®ects
of a federation.
2.3 An Integrated Federation
Now suppose that taxation in this two-region economy is determined by a central government (CG). Since
there is a single government entity setting tax policies for all groups of agents in all periods, we term this
5Throughout our analysis, we study the upward sloping branch of the La®er curve. So if there are multiple levels of ¿ such
that I(¿) = X, we select the lowest value of ¿.
6The proofs of the propositions are in the Appendix.
5the integrated solution.
Let ¿i
t for i = 1;2 and t = 1;2 denote the period t tax rate set for region i by the CG.7 As before, if the
CG elects not to ¯nance Gi for i = 1;2 through period 1 taxes, then it issues debt which pays a return of R
to ¯nance the excess of expenditures over tax revenues.
The CG has an objective to maximize the welfare of the agents across the two regions, which we measure
as the sum of lifetime expected utilities, using population weights as welfare weights. This could be amended
to allow for political pressure di®erent from population to determine CG policy.























where ¢i is the share of the population in region i.
Proposition 2 The solution to (8)-(9) entails tax smoothing over time by each region: ¿i
t = ¿i¤ for t = 1;2.
Further, if Gi increases, then ¿j¤ increases for j = 1;2.
The optimal taxes, denoted with a superscript ¤, in periods 1 and 2 are equal. This tax smoothing
re°ects the gain to the smoothing of distortionary taxes over time within a region. This form of tax smoothing
was also present in the solution of the single region's problem. But, through integration, the tax rates may
be at di®erent levels.
The second part of the proposition establishes that tax rates in each region depend on the level of
government spending in each of the regions. This interaction across regions is a key aspect of our model
as it highlights the ex ante optimality of revenue sharing. So, for example, an increase in G1 is met by an
increase in taxes in both regions 1 and 2. The increase in distortionary taxes needed to ¯nance the increase
in region 1 spending is spread across time and across regions. Under autarky, ¿iA is independent of Gj and
the sharing of the tax burden is not feasible. Put di®erently, in the integrated solution the di®erence in tax
rates across regions is smaller than under autarky for any (G1;G2) realization.
Complete tax smoothing across regions, de¯ned as ¿1¤ = ¿2¤, will occur in two special cases. First,
suppose v(c) = c.8 In this case, ¿1¤ = ¿2¤ will satisfy the ¯rst-order conditions implying c1
1 = c2
1. Di®erences
in Gi are re°ected in di®erent levels of si and thus in ci
2. If G1 > G2, then s1 > s2 implying c1
2 > c2
2.
Second, suppose that regional public spending is perfectly correlated, G1 = G2. In this case, the solution
with integration will be perfectly symmetric so that tax rates are equal. When the spending levels are
7Adding in another tax common to all agents would be redundant.
8A similar argument holds if u(c) = c. The case of v(c) = c will be used extensively below.
6perfectly correlated, there are no gains to revenue sharing. In fact, given the symmetry across regions,
consumption levels will be equalized as well.
As a ¯nal special case, assume there are no distortions from taxation: i.e. ° ! 1 so that n(¿) = ´ and
Z(¿) = ´(1 ¡ ¿). This implies Z0(¿) = ¡´ and I0(¿) = ´ so
Z
0(¿)
I0(¿) = ¡1. Following the ¯rst-order conditions




2.9 Thus when taxes are not distortionary the integrated solution
implies consumption smoothing across regions. In fact, this is exactly the same allocation obtained under
autarky: the regional tax rate is set to balance the regional budget.
Let W¤ be the expected value of the CG's objective in the solution to (8) where the expectation is over
the joint distribution of Gi for i = 1;2. As de¯ned earlier, WA is the expected value of the government's
problem under autarky.
Proposition 3 Comparing expected utility in autarky with that obtained under integration, (i) W¤ ¸ WA,
(ii) W¤ > W A if G1 6= G2 and labor taxation is distortionary and (iii) W¤ = WA if taxes are not distor-
tionary or if G1 = G2.
The di®erence W¤ ¡ WA is the gain from forming an integrated federation, coming from contingent
revenue sharing and thus the smoothing of distortionary taxes across regions. This integrated economy
represents a benchmark in two respects. First, there is only a single government so that any interaction
between governments within a multi-region union is non-existent by assumption. Second, the government in
this case has commitment power: it sets taxes prior to the actions of the agents.
We now study allocations within a multi-region economy in which these two aspects of the benchmark
are relaxed. This will provide insights into the interaction in the ¯scal policies of a central government and
multiple regional governments.
As we shall see, the incentives which underlie revenue sharing in the integrated federation are also a
source of the commitment problem. This highlights a central tension within a federation. Revenue sharing
is welfare improving as it facilitates the smoothing of distortionary taxes. But, without commitment by
the central government, regions will take advantage of the taxation power of the central government to the
detriment of the other region.
3 Decentralized allocations with Autonomous Regions
Our interest is the allocation from an economy in which regional governments are autonomous and interact
with the central government. In this setting, we can understand the conditions for bailout and the welfare
properties of federations with and without commitment by the central government, using the integrated
solution as a benchmark.
In this two-region union, taxation power is split across a hierarchy of government: the central government
(CG) and the government representing the agents in region i (RGi) are the active ¯scal players. The
9Speci¯cally, (16) implies c1
1 = c2
1 and, using (5), c1
2 = c2
2.
7government in region i will select tax rates ¿i
t for t = 1;2 and the CG will set a common tax rate, denoted ¿C,
on period 2 labor income. The regional governments can issue debt to cover the excess of regional expenses
over regional tax revenues. Since our focus is on tax obligations for the ¯nancing of debt obligations, we do
not consider a CG tax in period 1.
In addition to controlling di®erent ¯scal instruments, these three governments have di®erent objectives.
As above, the CG maximizes the weighted sum of the utilities of agents across regions while the regional
governments are interested only in the welfare of the agents within their region.
A key aspect of this multi-regional structure is the timing of decisions by these three governments. We
consider the environment in which the CG is unable to commit to its period 2 tax rate. The order of moves
is:
² Period 1
{ Nature selects G1;G2.
{ Regional government i sets ¿i
1
{ Private agents choose period 1 employment and saving
² Period 2
{ Central government sets ¿C and distributes revenues to regions
{ Regional government i sets ¿i
2. If it does not cover its obligations, agents incur a utility loss
(default cost) of ²
{ Private agents choose employment for period 2
The lack of commitment by the CG pertains to the choice of ¿C relative to period 1 taxes set by the
regional governments.10 We do allow the CG to choose ¿C prior to the choice of the governments in period
2 and this allows the CG to smooth taxes across regions. But, the CG sets its tax rate given the period 1
taxes chosen by the regional governments. Thus a regional government anticipates a response by the CG to
variations in regional debt.
Using the results of the integrated economy, summarized in Proposition 2, as a benchmark, our goal is to
understand when that allocation can be decentralized in the two-period game between governments outlined
above. Our results indicate that only in special circumstances can the integrated solution be decentralized.
A key aspect for some of the results is the amount of debt issued by region i held by residents of the
other region. Let µ
i denote the fraction of region's i0s debt held by its own members, and Bi the amount of
period 1 debt issued by the region i government per region i agent.
Note that embedded in the extensive form game is a default cost of ², denominated in utility terms. This
cost is intended to capture penalties associated with default, such as trade and borrowing restrictions.
10Our results are not dependent on the details of the timing of the game in period 2. This point is important as it indicates
that the results do not rely on a form of commitment to the order of moves in the period 2 game.
83.1 A Ricardian Equilibrium
We begin with a special case in which the integrated solution can be decentralized in the multi-region
economy. The key to this result is the assumption that taxes are not distortionary: ° ! 1, implying
n(¿) = ´.
To construct this equilibrium, assume µ
i = 1 for i = 1;2. In equilibrium, agents will be indi®erent
regarding the composition of their portfolio since government debt and storage will yield the same return.
Yet, the distribution of debt holdings will matter for the equilibrium outcome. The assumption µ
i = 1
for i = 1;2 is thus innocuous at the level of the individual but is instrumental in the construction of the
equilibrium.
In this equilibrium, the period 2 debt obligations of region i will be paid by tax revenues from region i
taxation. Agents in both regions will anticipate this taxation in deciding upon their savings in period 1.
Since each region holds its own debt, there are no links across the regions in equilibrium and thus a
Ricardian outcome should occur as long as the CG has no incentive to intervene. As we shall see, in the
Ricardian equilibrium, the CG has no incentive to intervene since the consumption levels of the agents are
equal across the two regions.
Proposition 4 If the default cost is near zero, i.e. ² ! 0, there exists a Ricardian equilibrium with non-
distorting taxes i® µ
i = 1.
We call this a Ricardian equilibrium because consumption levels and thus welfare are independent of
the level of Gi and the timing of taxes needed to pay for the public good. In equilibrium each regional
government pays o® its own debt, and recognizes this responsibility when deciding on the tax rate in the
¯rst period. Consumption levels are smoothed over time and are equal across regions.
We compare this allocation to that obtained under autarky and the integrated federation. There is
complete consumption smoothing across regions in all cases and no interaction across regions. Thus there
are no gains from integration when taxes are not distortionary but, at least in the Ricardian equilibrium, no
welfare costs either. Formally, letting WR be expected utility in the Ricardian equilibrium, we ¯nd
Proposition 5 When taxes are not distortionary, ° ! 1, the Ricardian equilibrium is the same allocation
as that obtained under autarky and integrated federation: WR=WA=W¤.
Though the CG is not committed to ¿C = 0, ex post it has no incentive to bailout the regional gov-
ernments. There is no incentive to bailout because: (i) period 2 consumption allocations are equal across
regions and (ii) there is no gain to the smoothing of taxes since labor supply is totally inelastic. We now
study how incentives for bail-out arise.
3.2 Bail-out
The construction of the Ricardian equilibrium rests on two assumptions. First, debt of region i is held
only by region i agents. Second, the tax on labor income is not distortionary. Thus the only incentive
9for intervention by the CG is to smooth consumption but, in equilibrium, there was no need for further
consumption smoothing.
We now argue that if these assumptions are relaxed, then the CG will have an incentive to bailout the
regional governments in period 2. This bail-out will destroy the Ricardian equilibrium and lead to socially
ine±cient allocations: the resulting allocations will di®er from the integrated solution.
The discussion is organized around two rationales for a CG bail-out.11 The ¯rst concerns the gains from
ex post consumption smoothing across regions when taxes are not distortionary. The second comes from the
desire of the CG to smooth distortionary taxes across regions even when there are no gains to consumption
smoothing.
3.2.1 Consumption Smoothing
Under the assumption that taxes are not distortionary, we characterize a bail-out equilibrium driven by




2), given available resources in period 2, results in equalization (smoothing)
of consumption levels across regions due to the strict concavity of v(¢).
We analyze the outcome in period 2 given the levels of debt issued by each region, Bi, and the fraction
of this debt held in total by all agents in region i, µ
i, for i = 1;2. After solving for the period 2 outcome, we
characterize the choice of period 1 taxes by the regional governments.
The following proposition states the conditions for bail-out in the case of G1 > G2. This is without loss
of generality since the only di®erence across regions is in the realized value of Gi.
Proposition 6 For G1 > G2 and " ! 0: (i) the CG fully bails-out the obligation of both regional gov-
ernments, and (ii) regional governments choose not to tax their citizens in either period, i® µ
1 < ¢1 and
µ
2 > ¢2.
This result about a CG bail-out is intuitive. If G1 > G2, then s1 > s2 so region 1 households will,
without intervention, have higher consumption in period 2. The CG will intervene and bailout if that action
redistributes in favor of region 2. Such a redistribution requires µ
1 < ¢1 and µ
2 > ¢2. The fact that more
equitable consumption is desired is an immediate consequence of v00(¢) < 0.
There is a subtle and important point here. Total consumption in the second period is ¯xed, given endow-
ments and storage decisions. So, the redistribution by the CG increases the consumption of region 2 agents
and reduces the consumption of region 1 agents relative to the default allocation. Thus the redistribution
per se is not favorable to region 1 agents. Still, their consumption is higher under a bail-out than if they
paid the entire tax bill. In e®ect, the region 1 agents are able to take advantage of the desires of the CG to
redistribute consumption away from them.
11We are grateful to Marco Bassetto for discussions which led to the enhanced development of this section relative to an
earlier draft.
10Figure 1
This is illustrated in Figure 1 which indicates the consumption levels of the old agents in both regions
under di®erent allocations. This graph takes as given the savings decisions of the agents and thus total
resources available for consumption are ¯xed, as indicated by the negatively sloped resource constraint. The
allocation under a bail-out is labeled B, the allocation under default is labeled D and the one under regional
taxation is labeled R. As seen in this ¯gure, the bail-out by the CG redistributes from region 1 to region 2
agents relative to the default allocation. Still this allocation is preferred by region 1 to the one achievable
with regional taxation.
There are other implications of the bail-out. First, the regional governments set taxes in period 2 equal
to zero, given the bail-out by the CG. Further, the regional governments in period 1 will anticipate a bail-out
by the government. Consequently each regional government will alter the pattern of intertemporal taxation
by reducing the tax in period 1 to zero as well and thus use the CG bail-out of its debt obligation to share
the burden of taxation with the other region.
Letting ~ W be expected life-time utility in a bail-out equilibrium, we ¯nd
Proposition 7 The expected utility in a bail-out equilibrium is less than the expected utility under integration
and autarky: ~ W < W A = W¤.
As indicated in Figure 1, the equilibrium allocation with bail-out is di®erent from the Ricardian allocation.
Since the Ricardian equilibrium entailed the same allocation of consumption as in the integrated solution,
the equilibrium characterized in Proposition 6 yields lower expected utility than the integrated solution.
Further, since the Ricardian equilibrium is the same outcome as autarky, expected utility under bail-out
must be less than expected utility under autarky.
This bail-out result contrasts with the Ricardian equilibrium characterized in Proposition 4. Comparing
these results, the key di®erence between bail-out and regional taxation is in the holding of the regional debt.
In the construction of the Ricardian equilibrium, it was crucial that µ
i = 1 for i = 1;2. Else, the regional
government would choose to default. If the bulk of the debt is held by the region with the lower level
of saving, then the CG will have an incentive to bail-out the regional government and thus e®ect a more
equitable distribution of consumption.
Comparing these proposition highlights an important element of the model without distortionary taxes:
there are multiple equilibria. If we ¯x G1 > G2, there will be an isolated Ricardian equilibrium in which
µ
i = 1 for i = 1;2 and a set of bail-out equilibria satisfying µ
1 < ¢1 and µ
2 > ¢2. For other values of µ
i,
there will be default and thus these are not equilibria. This multiplicity is re°ected in the distribution of
debt holdings across the economy: in the Ricardian equilibrium debt is held within the issuing region while
debt holdings are more widespread in the bail-out equilibrium. Of course, at the individual level, agents
remain indi®erent about the composition of their portfolios.
113.2.2 Tax Smoothing
Here we explore a second basis for a bail-out by the CG. If the amount of debt outstanding is not equal
across regions, i.e. B1 6= B2, then a common tax will minimize the distortion associated with the repayment
of the regional debt. Thus a bail-out will occur in equilibrium.12
To make this argument clear, we make two assumptions. First, assume labor taxes are distortionary
as employment depends on the tax rate. Second, we assume v00(¢) = 0 throughout this section so that
the consumption smoothing motive is eliminated from the analysis. From the discussion of the integrated
solution, v00(¢) = 0 implies tax smoothing across time and across regions is optimal.
In the equilibrium we construct, there is full bail-out of regional obligations in period 2 so that ¿i
2 = 0,
for i = 1;2. In anticipation of this bail-out, the regions run excessive de¯cits and this creates a socially
ine±cient distortion in the intertemporal pattern of labor taxes.
Proposition 8 Given Bi, i = 1;2, there exists a bail-out equilibrium in which ¿i
2 = 0, I(¿) = R
P
i=1;2 ¢iBi
and the regional governments set period 1 tax rates lower than ¿.
The second period outcome, given Bi, is for the CG to bailout the regional debt. In response, the regional
governments set ¿i
2 = 0 for i = 1;2.13 In addition, the regional governments will reduce period 1 tax rates
to take advantage of the CG bail-out in period 2. However, the tax rate in period 1 need not fall to zero
since there is a utility loss to agents from having taxes excessively distorted across periods.
Turning to the issue of normative assessment of this bail-out equilibrium, we prove it is not always welfare
reducing relative to the autarky equilibrium. In this discussion we assume that two regions are of the same
size: ¢ = 1
2. Letting W be the expected utility under bail-out for the tax smoothing case, we ¯nd
Proposition 9 The expected utility in a bail-out equilibrium is smaller than the expected utility under inte-
gration. If the correlation of the spending shocks is large (near 1), then a bail-out equilibrium is worse than
autarky. The di®erence between the expected utility in a bail-out equilibrium and autarky increases with the
variability of G when the correlation of the spending shocks is su±ciently small (near ¡1).
Comparing the integrated and bail-out outcomes, there is smoothing of distortionary taxes across the
regions in both cases. In the integrated solution, taxes were also smooth over time. For the equilibrium
characterized in Proposition 8, in contrast, the anticipated bail-out of the central government induces the
regional governments to run excessive de¯cits. As a consequence, distortionary taxes are not smoothed over
time. This ine±ciency is a consequence of the inability of the CG to commit not to bailout the debt of
the regional governments. Thus the equilibrium is not the same as that from the integrated economy and
expected utility is lower than in the integrated solution.
12A su±ciently large " is needed to support this repayment. Else, the regional and central governments will all choose to
default on outstanding debt.
13Here ¿i
t is the tax rate of region i in period t and ¿ is the period 2 tax rate set by the CG in the bail-out equilibrium.
12The welfare cost of the bail-out equilibrium relative to autarky is that agents in one region are led to
¯nance the excessive de¯cits of the other region. When the corr(G1;G2) is near 1, the gains to tax smoothing
across regions are small. In this case, the costs of the bail-out due to tax distortions are large enough that
autarky yields expected utility in excess of expected utility under a bail-out.
Comparing the expected utility under bailout to autarky, there are two important factors highlighted in
Proposition 9: the correlation and variability of the spending shocks. Relative to autarky, there are gains to
tax smoothing across regions in the bail-out equilibrium. These gains are larger when the correlation of G1
and G2 is near -1. Further, these gains are larger if the variability of G is large.
Following the logic underlying Proposition 9, it is possible to construct parametric examples in which
expected utility in a bail-out equilibrium exceeds that under autarky. To illustrate, suppose ° = 1, R = 1,
¢ = 1
2, Gi = ¹ G § " with equal probability, and corr(G1;G2) = ¡1. We hold ¹ G constant, and compute the
equilibria under the di®erent regimes for di®erent values of ".
The construction of the bail-out equilibrium uses the ¯rst-order condition of a regional government,
(26), along with the government budget constraint, (31), to solve for the two tax rates ¹ ¿1 and ¹ ¿2 given the
¯xed aggregate spending by the two regions, ¹ G. Total regional government spending is constant due to the
assumption that corr(G1;G2) = ¡1. Likewise, tax rates in the integrated economy equilibrium are also
independent of ". In contrast, taxes in the autarkic equilibrium vary with ".
For ¹ G = 0:4 there is a bailout equilibrium in which ¹ ¿1 = 0:205, ¹ ¿2 = 0:3861, and the tax rate for the
integrated economy equilibrium is ¿¤ = 0:2764. Since there is no aggregate uncertainty, there is no variability
in these equilibria. The outcome under autarky is constructed for each of the two possible realizations of Gi
using the budget constraint, (7), to compute the tax rate given ". With " = 0, the expected lifetime utility
under autarky exceeds that under bailout since there is no uncertainty in taxes under either regime but an
intertemporal distortion in taxes under bailout. As the variability of ¿A increases with ", the expected utility
in autarky will decrease.
The welfare calculations are summarized in the Table 1 for three levels of uncertainty in taxes under
autarky, represented by ". The second column is the di®erence between expected utility in bailout and
autarky, ¹ W ¡ WA. If the variability of G, (and thus of ¿A), is low enough, autarky dominates bail-out.
But, as the variability of tax rates increases, the bail-out equilibrium generates higher expected utility than
autarky.





Table 1: Welfare Comparison: Autarky vs. Bailout
There is an interesting contrast between this result and that obtained for the welfare implications of
13monetary union with a centralized monetary authority. Proposition 3 of Cooper and Kempf (2004) argues
that there are welfare gains to a monetary union when shocks are highly correlated across countries. The
argument, following Mundell, is that the delegation of a policy instrument to a central authority is not too
costly when shocks are su±ciently positively correlated. Yet, as indicated by Proposition 9, when shocks are
highly correlated, then there are little gains to tax smoothing and autarky may dominate a weak federation.
Thus, in contrast to monetary unions, federations created to take advantage of tax smoothing are more likely
to be welfare improving if shocks are not too positively correlated.
3.3 The Value of Commitment
The conclusion from this analysis is that the combination of autonomous regional governments and a central
government leads to equilibria which will generally di®er from the integrated (¯rst-best) equilibrium, except
under very stringent conditions. This raises the question of the source of this sub-optimality: is it the
plurality of ¯scal players or the lack of commitment by the central government? We argue that the root of
the problem is the weakness of the central government: the CG sets taxes in the second period, given the
choice of tax rates for period 1 by the regional governments. It is then merely responding to incentives put
in place in the ¯rst period by the regional governments: that is, the CG is \weak".
Suppose to the contrary that the CG is \strong": it chooses period 2 ¯scal and redistributive policy at
the beginning of period 1, before the regional governments set ¯scal policies for periods 1 and 2. It is now
the regional governments which respond to the CG.
Here we consider a \reasonable" commitment policy consistent with ¯scal federalism. Assume the CG is
able to credibly announce to the RGs and the agents in the whole economy both the central tax rate ¿C and
the fraction of the CG's total ¯scal income that each region will receive, i.e. the commitment to a revenue
sharing scheme between regions. For this type of strategic stance and its transfers, we ¯nd:
Proposition 10 Under commitment of the central government, if there are no labor distortions or v(¢) is
linear, the unique equilibrium is the integrated allocation.
Even with multiple ¯scal agents, the integrated allocation may be supported. Thus, the suboptimality
of the equilibria with bail-out re°ects the inability of the CG to commit.
In these two cases, the commitment equilibrium, being equivalent to the integrated equilibrium, is also
equivalent to the Ricardian equilibrium. This proposition makes clear that, despite an apparent reduction
in ¯scal tools (the central government only taxes in the second period to make transfers to indebted re-
gional governments), the ability to commit restores the ¯rst-best allocation. By committing to interregional
transfers (it taxes equally and redistributes across regions), the CG is able to eliminate the free-riding of
RGs.
This result makes clear that the lack of commitment is crucial for reaping the ¯scal bene¯ts of integration.
A strong CG is able to create a system of revenue sharing which facilitates the smoothing of distortionary
14taxes across regions. But, when a CG is weak, its ability to smooth the burden of distortionary taxation
becomes a tool for bail-out and the consequent e®ects on welfare.
4 Fiscal constraints
The analysis has shown the bene¯ts of smoothing distortionary taxes across regions. These gains to ¯scal
integration are attainable if the central government can commit to its ¯scal policy.
But, without commitment power, these gains may be o®set by the choices of regional governments to
lower taxes in the ¯rst period. This adverse incentive e®ect appears in the form of ¿i
1 being too low and thus
Bi too high relative to the integrated allocation. As a consequence, the bail-out is ex ante welfare reducing
and, as we have seen, may imply that autarky is preferable to joining the federation.
It is instructive to use the model to interpret how various federations have attempted to deal with this
commitment problem though various forms of ¯scal constraints. Our goal here is not to explain the di®erences
across these federations but rather to study them through the lenses of our model.
4.1 Argentina
Argentina is one of the most decentralized federations and has struggled with bailouts at the federal level.
The sub-national "provincial" governments are responsible for almost 50% of the total consolidated public
expenditures (more than 2/3 when pensions are excluded). However, most taxation powers are delegated
to the central government. Hence, Argentina is characterized by large vertical transfers; in 1997, 56% of
provincial expenditures were ¯nanced through transfers from the central government. Nine provinces ¯nance
less than 20% of their expenditures with their own resources.
The intergovernmental transfer scheme appears particularly complex, Saiegh and Tommasi (1999) call
it the 'federal ¯scal labyrinth' of Argentina. Altogether in the 90's, both the central and the provincial
governments have run large de¯cits. As a result, the provincial debts soared, growing on average from 40%
of total revenues in 1994 to 55% in 1999.
Provinces facing unsustainable de¯cits have regularly been bailed-out by the central government, through
various schemes, as discussed in Tommasi, Saiegh, and Sanguinetti (2001). These bail-outs have represented
a signi¯cant proportion of the ¯nancial needs of provinces: in 1994, they amounted to almost 90% of the
total provincial de¯cits. In particular, the pension regimes of 11 provinces have been nationalized between
1994 and 1996.
Altogether the central government seems unable to monitor the provincial ¯scal policies, both in terms
of taxation and public expenditures. According to Nicolini, Posadas, Sanguinetti, Sanguinetti, and Tomassi
(2002), this has created \a general moral hazard problem that undermines the incentives of lower units to
behave in ¯scally responsive ways".
From the perspective of our model the mixture of large intergovernmental transfers, low control of lo-
15cal public expenditures and recurrent bail-outs are clearly indicative of a weak central government, lacking
commitment power, and a sub-optimal situation, characterized by large distortions due to the tax system.
Various institutional reforms such as the currency board system put in place in the 1990s and the ensuing
discussions of dollarization were attempts to reinforce the power of the central government to resist pres-
sures from the provincial ¯scal authorities. However these reforms have been incomplete as they were not
addressing the core of the problem: the federal ¯scal labyrinth that left the central government vulnerable
to appeals for bailing out by regions with large debts.14 The task confronting Argentine public authorities
is to directly tackle the issue of distorted ¯scal federalism with the aim of stricter ¯scal responsibilities for
the provincial governments. A survey of the various plans aiming at modifying the intergovernmental ¯scal
relations in Argentina that have been discussed and enforced in the recent years (Cuevas (2003)) concludes
that while useful they do not represent a major break from the past.
4.2 U.S.
The U.S. is a federation of a di®erent nature than Argentina. Relative to Argentina, the central government
in the U.S. is largely immune to ¯scal pressures of the regional (state) governments.
There are automatic interregional transfers from the Federal budget to the states. For example, the
Welfare Reform Act of 1996 replaced a system of federal transfers automatically linked to welfare expenditures
decided by state authorities by a system of lump-sum federal transfers with the states being fully responsible
for any additional dollar spent on welfare. This is a clear evidence of the inability of states to pressure the
Federal government for more aid.
All states but one (Vermont) have a ¯scal constraint on their ability to borrow. Their stringency is not
uniform and they do not forbid creative accounting measures. As a consequence, the e®ectiveness of these
constraints is disputed. Whereas Poterba (1996) found that they have been e®ective on limiting state ¯scal
pro°igacy, a recent study by Canova and Pappa (2004) claims that these e®ects have been overemphasized:
the di®erences between states with restrictive limits and states with looser ones are statistically and often
economically unimportant.
From our perspective, the federal transfer system can be characterized as an ex ante revenue sharing
scheme, with a large commitment power given to the federal level. Excessive de¯cits at the state level
¯nanced by federal bailouts are unlikely in the U.S. federation. Hence, there is no wonder that the ¯scal
restraints on states' ¯scal policies are found ine®ective. If anything, one might argue that these limits are
too severe in that state governments are unable to smooth taxes over time.
4.3 E.U.
The current ¯scal situation and policies run in Europe have four main features. The EU does not qualify
as a ¯scal federation. The budget of the European commission is small and represent at most 1.30% of the
14Cooper and Kempf (2001) discuss these policies using a model of regional pressures within a federation.
16EU's GDP. For ¯scal year 2005, the European commission proposes a budget representing 1.14% of the EU's
GDP. But the larger EU countries, including France and Germany pledge to limit it to 1% at most.
Moreover the European commission has hardly any autonomous source of income and depends partially
on contributions made by member countries. In the constitutional treaty currently discussed, the devolution
of taxing powers to the EU itself is possible but will request unanimous approval by the member countries:
hence it remains an unlikely event at best. Finally its expenditures are earmarked for sectoral (agriculture)
or structural (regional) policies. There is no scope for ¯scal federalism in Europe. As far as the European
Central Bank is concerned, a provision in the Maastricht Treaty explicitly prohibits any contribution from
any of its entities to any public administration.
The regional governments use the ¯scal tools at their disposal so as to stabilize the economy. According
to Gali and Perotti (2003), discretionary public de¯cits have become more counter-cyclical in the EMU
countries after the approval of the Maastricht Treaty creating the EMU than before. On the whole, public
de¯cits in the euro zone have tended to decline on average in the 90's but have started to grow again after
the actual launching of the euro in 1999.
Precisely for fear of an increase in national public de¯cits within the euro zone, which was perceived as
a liability on the credibility of the European currency, EU countries set up the Stability and Growth Pact.
The critical provisions of the pact were threefold: a) each country would have to balance its public de¯cit
over the medium term, b) national annual public de¯cits (including all public administrations and agencies)
would be limited to 3% of GDP, except under severely depressing conditions, c) in case of breach of this
constraint, the faulty country would be liable to pecuniary penalties.
The model studied in Section 3 can easily be amended to accommodate restrictions on debt. In fact,
it is straightforward to determine the set of debt restrictions which would reproduce the outcome under
integration. The di±culty with considering these types of restrictions is commitment: in period 2 the central
government may have an incentive to bailout the regional governments and thus relax these debt restrictions.
In fact, the restrictions in the Stability and Growth Pact have proven to be unenforceable. Following the
November 2003 decision by the European council of Finance ministers not to apply these penalties to France
and Germany despite their public de¯cits above 3%, the European council issued a revision of the pact in
March 2005. In e®ect, this version considerably weakens the ¯scal discipline and its enforcement in the EU.
The various limits set on national ¯scal policies act more as guidelines than as e®ective constraints on the
discretionary powers of national Treasuries.
From the perspective of our model, it is logical that, in the absence of ¯scal federalism and any signi¯cant
central ¯scal authority in the EU, the national countries should be allowed to exert discretionary powers to
stabilize their economies. But two inconsistencies appear in the EU situation. First, if there is no bail-out
possibility because of the absence of any \federal" taxation, then there is no need to limit de¯cit spending.
The importance of the Stability and Growth Pact as a way of curbing \excessive de¯cits" disappears when
there is no central government that can be induced to make transfers to the national treasuries. National
17governments will have to face the subsequent consequences of their current de¯cits. Second, these limits on
de¯cit spending by national governments, if enforced, are likely to be harmful as they limit tax smoothing.
Therefore it is no surprise that lately the member countries have decided to loosen them.
Proposition 9 provides further insights into the EU. As argued in that proposition, federations can yield
higher expected utility than autarky even if bail-outs occur in equilibrium. Thus, ¯scal restrictions may
not be necessary to have some welfare bene¯ts from a federation. However, note that the EU, following the
arguments of Mundell, was constructed with the idea that countries with positively correlated shocks were
natural partners. While this may indeed be true from the perspective of a monetary union, Proposition 9
tells us that in this case the gains to ¯scal integration may be relatively small since there is little room for
tax smoothing across countries.
The absence of ¯scal federalism in Europe is delicate to assess. According to our theory, a ¯scal federalism
scheme in Europe is desirable to smooth taxes across regions. But this requires a strong commitment
technology such that the central/federal authority is not vulnerable to the bail-out of national authorities
running de¯cits. From this perspective, rather than issuing unenforceable strict ¯scal limitations or harmless
guidelines, the European countries should rather think about the establishment of a credible ¯scal federalism
scheme.
5 Conclusion
The goal of this paper was to study the factors which determine who pays the obligation incurred by a region
within a federation. Within our framework, the best policy is one of ex ante ¯scal federalism. There are two
advantages to such a policy. First, there are e±ciency gains from spreading distortionary taxes across large
groups of agents. Second, if the tax and transfer policy is determined prior to the setting of region speci¯c
taxes, then the outcome is time consistent: the central government has an incentive to maintain its promises
and not to ¯nance additional de¯cit spending.
But the central government may not have the commitment power needed to support this allocation.
Ex post the central government may be induced to bailout the regional government in order to smooth
consumption and distortionary taxes across the regions.
We characterize the conditions under which bailouts occur and their welfare implications. We associate
the occurrence of bail-outs with the inability of the central government to commit. This does not imply
that autarky is preferred to a \weak" ¯scal federalism where bail-outs occur. Focusing on the tax smoothing
motive, a weak central ¯scal federalism scheme may be better than autarky when the correlation between
regional public expenditures shocks is low and their variance is su±ciently large. But, when the shocks
across regions are highly positively correlated, then the bail-outs dominate and there is a welfare loss from
the federation relative to autarky. We discuss some observations on integovermental ¯scal relations in the
US, EU and Argentina, in light of these insights.
One important element in the interaction between regions and the central government missing from our
18analysis is monetary policy. In the case of Argentina, the creation of regional monetary instruments during
the currency period, and more generally the monetization of regional debt, played a key role in the economic
crisis of 2001. For the E.U., even though there is no federation income tax, there is a central monetary
authority and thus pressure from individual countries may still be exerted upon that entity.
A second element for future consideration is the determination of the default costs. These are taken as
given here and do play a role in supporting bail-out equilibria with tax-smoothing. The source of these costs
and, more interestingly, how they are determined within a federation, are of interest. These matters remain
for future study.
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Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. The RGi chooses (¿i
1;¿i
2) to maximize W(¿i
1;¿i
2) subject to the government budget constraint, (7).























Using (5), these two ¯rst order conditions imply »(¿i
1) = »(¿i
2) and hence ¿i
1 = ¿i
2 ´ ¿iA.
Let V (Gi) ´ W(¿A(Gi);¿A(Gi)) where ¿A(Gi) is given in Proposition 1 along with the regional govern-
ment's budget constraint of G = I(¿A)
(1+R)
R . Taking a derivative of V (Gi) with respect to Gi and using (5)
implies





As »(¿) = ¡¿
°(1¡¿), 1
1+» > 1 as long as ¿ 2 (0;
°
1+°). This restriction on ¿ is justi¯ed by observing that
¿ =
°
1+° is the tax rate which maximizes the government tax revenue, ¿n(¿). As ° > 0, »(¿A(Gi)) 2 (¡1;0)
and so V 0(Gi) < 0.
In order for utility to fall as Gi increases, the consumption levels in at least one period must fall. From
(5), the consumption levels move together. Thus as Gi increases, consumption falls in each period.
Proof of Proposition 2














for i = 1;2 where ¸ is the multiplier associated with (9). Using the household's ¯rst order condition of
u0(ci
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1+»(¿) which is monotone in ¿. Thus ¿i
t = ¿i¤ for i = 1;2.









20for i = 1;2. The marginal \cost-bene¯t" ratios of tax distortions, measured by the ratio of marginal utility
loss to marginal tax revenue gain, are equalized across regions.
To see that both tax rates increase in Gi, suppose without loss of generality that G1 increases. If ¿¤2
is ¯xed, then in order for the government's budget constraint to hold ¿¤1 will have to increase. From the
second part of Proposition 1, c1






1+»(¿1¤) is an increasing function of ¿1¤. Consequently, this policy of holding ¿¤2 constant will
violate (16). In order for (16) to hold, the increase in G1 must be met by an increase in ¿¤i for i = 1;2.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. (i) W¤ < W A is not possible since autarky is feasible in the integrated setting, implying W¤ ¸ WA.
(ii) From the proof of Proposition 2, the tax rates under the two institutional structures are di®erent
whenever G1 6= G2. If these tax di®erences are distortionary, i.e. ° < 1, then W¤ > W A.
(iii) If the shocks are perfectly positively correlated so that G1 = G2 in all states of nature, then the
regions are identical and thus expected utility is the same under integration as autarky. From (16), if
G1 = G2, then by symmetry ¿1¤ = ¿2¤. As a consequence, the budget constraint holds for each region. This
is exactly the same level of taxation which would occur in autarky so that W¤ = WA.
If taxes are not distortionary, ° ! 1, then
Z
0(¿)
I0(¿) = ¡1 so that, using (13) and (14), taxes and thus
consumption allocations are the same across regions in the integrated solution. As a consequence, the budget
constraint holds for each region. This is also true for the allocation under autarky so that W¤ = WA.
Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. First we show that if µ
i = 1;8i = 1;2 then RGi is indi®erent between tax and default and thus
will choose to tax given the negligible default cost. Then we argue that the CG will set ¿C = 0.








To check the incentives of the RGi, suppose CG sets ¿C = 0 and thus does not bail-out in period 2. What
are RGi's options given the (anticipated) CG's policy? If it taxes, private agents in region i have utility of
v(´ + R(si ¡ bi)). If it defaults the consumption is the same since only region i agents hold region i debt.
With the negligible default cost, the region will choose to raise taxes to pay-o® its debt: ¿i
2´ = Rbi.
Anticipating this taxation and ¿C = 0, private agent's savings in period 1 will solve
W(¿i
1;¿i
2 j Gi) = maxsiu(e + Gi + Z(¿i
1) ¡ si) + ¯v(Z(¿i
2) + siR): (17)
Using the condition that Z(¿) = (1¡¿)´, the ¯rst order condition is u0(e+Gi +(1¡¿i
1)´¡si) = ¯Rv0((1¡
¿i
2)´ + siR). Using ¿i
2´ = Rbi and Gi ¡ ¿i
2´ = bi, the ¯rst-order condition can be written as
u0(e + ´ ¡ (si ¡ bi)) = ¯Rv0(´ + (si ¡ bi)R): (18)
21Thus, the di®erence (si ¡ bi) is the same for all regions regardless of the period 1 realization of Gi. This
means that along the path of the Ricardian equilibrium, period 2 consumption is equal across agents in
the two regions. That is, anticipating tax ¯nanced debt service in period 2, agents save the excess regional
transfer they get in period 1, so that c1
2 = c2
2.
To check the incentives of the CG, note that by choosing a value of ¿C, it can transfer consumption









2 = ´ + R
X
i
¢i(si ¡ bi) (20)
.
Given that v(¢) is strictly concave, the CG would choose a consumption allocation with complete equality.
But this is precisely the consumption allocation in the Ricardian equilibrium. Thus the CG is unable to
intervene to further smooth consumption and it will choose ¿C = 0.
For any µ
i < 1, the RGi prefers default over regional tax for ² near zero, even when it anticipates that
CG will set ¿C = 0. If the regional government taxes agents in its region, some of the revenue is used to pay
o® agents in the other region. If the regional government defaults, consumption of agents in its region will
thus be higher. So, for a su±ciently small default cost, there is no Ricardian equilibrium if µ
i < 1.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. In the Ricardian equilibrium, RGi chooses (¿i
1;¿i
2) to maximize W(¿i
1;¿i
2 j Gi), de¯ned in (17)










This is exactly the same problem a regional government solves in autarky, as in Proposition 1. As the
¯rst-order conditions are the same for the two problems, so will be the level of expected utility: WR = WA.
From Proposition 3, W¤ = WA when there are no tax distortions. Thus in the Ricardian equilibrium
WR = W¤ = WA.
Proof of Proposition 6
Proof. Moving ¯rst at the start of period 2, the CG selects a common tax and the distribution of the tax
revenue across regions, given the outstanding debt obligations of the two regions. Speci¯cally, it solves:
maxT 1;T 2
X






¢i )Tj ¡ (T1 + T2)) ¡ ¢i²¥(¢iBiR¡T i) (21)
where Ti 2 [0;¢iBiR] is the CG's total payment to holders of region i0s debt, T1 + T2 is the common
economy-wide tax (per agent) needed to ¯nance such payments, and ¥(x) = 1 if x > 0 and zero otherwise.
Full bail-out by the CG is denoted by Ti = ¢iBiR for i = 1;2.
22If the CG chooses less than full bail-out for any region i , then RGi will default on the debt. As shown
in the proof of Proposition 2, the RGi is indi®erent between default and taxation when µ
i = 1. For µ
i < 1,
RGi will strictly prefer default for " near zero. Thus the only equilibrium if µ
i 6= 1 is full bail-out.
Social welfare under a full bail-out can be written as:
X
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j is the net transfer to an agent in region i from
bailing-out region j0s debt, and Di =
P
j Di
j is the net transfer to such an agent from a full bail-out of all
regional debts. The Di
j variables are key as they measure the direction and the extent of the redistribution









j = 0 for j = 1;2.
The CG will prefer to bailout the regional governments i® D2 > 0 > D1. In this case, the bail-out will
redistribute resources away from region 1 and towards region 2. Such a redistribution in favor of region
2 will lead to a more equitable distribution of consumption given the assumption G1 > G2 which implies
s1 > s2. Hence, D2 > 0 > D1 implies that the repayment of the debt through a common tax will raise
the consumption of region 2 agents relative to region 1. Since this allocation is more equitable than the
allocation under default, the CG prefers it to the default allocation.
For this to be an equilibrium, the CG must have an incentive to fully bail-out both region's debt. For
this we need both D1
1 < 0 and D1
2 < 0, or else CG would be better o® not bailing out the region that results
in a net transfer to agents of region 1. These conditions on D1
j mean, respectively, µ
1 < ¢1 and µ
2 > ¢2, as
in the proposition.
If D1 > 0 > D2, then the CG will not have an incentive to bailout the governments. In this case, a bail-
out would redistribute in favor of region 1 and that is not ex post desirable to the CG. Thus D2 > 0 > D1
is necessary for a bail-out to occur.
In anticipation of a bail-out, the RGi solves the following problem, recognizing the impact of its own
debt on the tax to be set by the CG:
max¿i
1u(Gi + e + ´(1 ¡ ¿i
1) ¡ si) + ¯v(´(1 ¡ ¿) + siR): (23)
s.t.:















The ¯rst constraint de¯nes the debt issued by region i given its period 1 tax and the realized Gi. The
second re°ects the tax rate set by the central government in period 2 in a full bail-out, which satis¯es
¿´ = R(¢B1 + (1 ¡ ¢)B2). The third constraint re°ects agents' optimal saving.
23The derivative of RGi's objective with respect to ¿i




















This is always negative given the saving ¯rst-order condition of the representative agent. Hence ¿i
1 = 0.
Proof of Proposition 7
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 3 and the fact that the bail out allocation di®ers from the integrated
allocation.
Proof of Proposition 8
Proof. At the start of period 2, the debt levels (per regional agent) in each of the two regions are given
as (B1;B2) where Bi = Gi ¡ I(¿i
1). The CG moves ¯rst and selects a common tax, ¿, for period 2 and













remainder of the region's debt obligation is ¯nanced by a region i speci¯c tax, ¿i
2.




























Here Bi is the amount of debt per region-head issued by RGi. Hence, this corresponds to an amount of debt
per federation-head equal to ¢iBi.




















so that the CG would choose ¿1
1 = ¿2
1:
Thus, given debt levels the CG would like the regions to set equal tax rates in the second period. This
can be achieved by the CG if it sets the common period 2 tax rate, ¿, high enough to ¯nance the entire debt
obligation of the regional governments and distributes the revenues to them as needed to ¯nance their debt.
This tax rate solves I(¿) = R(
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Thus the regional government's know that the central government will have an incentive to fully ¯nance
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Using Bi = Gi ¡ I(¿i
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(27)
implying ¿i
1 < ¿ for i = 1;2.
Proof of Proposition 9
Throughout this proof, the following assumptions are maintained:
² v00(¢) = 0
² Distorting labor taxes, (° < 1)
² A joint probability distribution of regional spending shocks, (G1;G2), with identical marginal distri-
butions for Gi, i = 1;2.
Tax revenue from a tax rate ¿ is I(¿) = ¿n(¿), where n(¿) = (1¡¿)1=°. We only consider tax rates such
that ¿ 2 [0;
°
1+°]. On this interval, I(¢) is strictly increasing and strictly concave.15
Since v(¢) is linear and u(¢) is strictly concave, ci
1 is a constant determined by the saving ¯rst order
condition. Thus ci
1 = c for any realization of the random public spending shocks, (G1;G2) in all three
allocations under consideration: autarky, integrated economy, and the bail-out equilibrium characterized in
Proposition 8.
Expected life-time utility of an agent is thus given by:
W = u(c) + ¯Ef(Rs(¿1) + Z(¿2))g
where ¯rst and second period taxes, and hence labor income and savings, may depend on the realization of
(G1;G2), and consequently. From the agents' ¯rst period budget constraint:
s(¿1) = G + e + Z(¿1) ¡ c;








The determination of (¿1;¿2) will depend on the institution.
Autarky From Proposition 1, for every realization of G, a common tax rate is set for both periods,












Expected utility under autarky is then:
WA = u(c) + ¯R
·









where the expectation is taken with respect to the marginal distribution of G.
Integrated Economy From Proposition 2 and the discussion following it for the linear v(¢) case, there















The corresponding expected lifetime utility for the integrated economy is therefore:
W¤ = u(c) + ¯R
·









Tax-smoothing Bail-out From Proposition 8 we have a ¯rst period tax set by the regional government,
¹ ¿i
1, and a common second period tax set by the CG, ¹ ¿2, which depend on the realizations of public spending











The expected utility is then given by:
¹ W = u(c) + ¯R
·







Welfare Comparison: integration versus bail-out W¤ ¸ ¹ W is clearly true since the equilibrium
under bail-out was feasible in the integrated solution. Moreover, as in Proposition 8, the tax rates in the
bail-out equilibrium are not the same as those obtained under integration. Thus in this case W¤ > ¹ W.
26Welfare Comparison: Bail-out versus Autarky We ¯rst argue that if the correlation between G1
and G2 is near 1, then W < W A. Comparing the welfare measures under autarky and bail-out, we can
write ( ¹ W ¡ WA) = ( ¹ W ¡ W¤) + (W¤ ¡ WA). As argued above, ( ¹ W ¡ W¤) is negative. By Proposition 3,
(W¤ ¡ WA) is positive due to the ability to share tax revenues and thus smooth regional taxes. However,
when corr(G1;G2) = 1, there is no scope for tax smoothing over the regions. Therefore W¤ = WA and
¹ W ¡ WA is consequently negative. By continuity, this is true for corr(G1;G2) su±ciently close to 1.
We now argue that W ¡WA is increased if the correlation between G1 and G2 is near -1 and the variance
of G is su±ciently large. For this argument, we also assume ¢ = 1
2.
When corr(G1;G2) = ¡1 and ¢ = 1
2, the average of the Gi is always equal to the G ´ 1
2(G1 + G2).
Using (26) and (31), ¿ and the ¿i are constant in the bail-out equilibria. Therefore W does not depend on
the variance of public expenditures.
But, this is not the case under autarky, where a regional government must bear the risk of variability in G.
From Proposition 1, the regional government will set a tax rate constant over the two periods which depends




I(¿) + e + Z(¿) ¡ s) + ¯(Z(¿) + sR) (33)
where we used the government budget constraint G = 1+R
R I(¿). Thus, instead of thinking about the
variability of G, we will focus instead on the variability of ¿.
Using n(¿) = (1¡¿)
1
° and the de¯nition of Z(¿) from (3), WA(¿) is strictly concave. The ¯rst derivative




















Under the restriction that ¿ 2 [0;
°
1+°], ¿ < ° so that W00(¿) < 0.
Consider the following speci¯cation for the tax rate: ¿ = ¹+¾² where ² is a random variable with mean
zero and ¹ is the mean of the tax rate. A given realization of ¿ induces a realization of G for this region
through G = 1+R
R I(¿). We parameterize the variability of ¿ by ¾. The strict concavity of W(¿) implies that
W(¿) decreases when ¾ increases. Thus W ¡ WA increases as the variability of G increases.
Proof of Proposition 10
Proof. We de¯ne commitment as the ¯scal policy applied in period 2 by CG, but decided by CG at the
beginning of period 1, even before the regional governments decide and implement their own ¯scal policies.
The realization of Gi for i = 1;2 are known by CG when it chooses its tax.
Commitment with no labor distortions
Consider the special case where ° ! 1 and ni
t = ´; 8i;t: This implies I0 (¿) = ´ = ¡Z0 (¿).
27The CG decides ¿C and the two transfers T1 and T2 given to the RGs in period 2. The budget constraint
for the regional government i is:
Gi = ¿i









u(Gi + e + Z(¿i
1) ¡ si) + ¯v(Z(¿i
2 + ¿C) + siR)








i is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint of RGi.





u(Gi + e + Z(¿i
1) ¡ si) + ¯v(Z(¿i







T1 + T2 = ¿C´:
When ¿C = 0 = T1 = T2, each RGi acts in isolation and we obtain the Ricardian solution. Since, using
Proposition 3, this is the same allocation as the integrated solution, the policy of ¿C = 0 = T1 = T2 is the
solution to (39).
Commitment with v(¢) linear
De¯ne by ­ the per-capita tax income of CG







­ is divided between the two regions according to:




i is the share of the tax receipts transferred to region i, and ³
1 + ³
2 = 1. So, the per capita transfer








, chosen by CG at the beginning of period 1 and applied in period
2, which solves the optimization problem of CG. We prove that in the case of v(¢) linear, the commitment






























u(Gi + e + Z(¿i
1) ¡ si) + ¯(Z(¿i









































i is the multiplier associated with the budget constraint of RGi, and using the de¯nition of ­ in
deriving (42).





u(Gi + e + Z(¿i
1) ¡ si) + ¯(Z(¿i
2 + ¿C) + siR)
¤

























2 = 0 satis¯es all the constraints and is
identical to the integration solution, which is the ¯rst-best solution in the case of v linear. Hence this is the
solution to (6).
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